












a	 huge	 impact	 on	 the	 way	 philosophers	 think	 about	 well-being.1	Indeed,	 many	
assume	it	completely	refutes	hedonism	once	and	for	all,	and	not	merely	hedonism,	
but	any	theory	that	focuses	exclusively	on	mental	states.	However,	as	we	shall	see,	
Nozick’s	 example	 and	 its	 implications	 are	 more	 complex	 than	 people	 typically	
realize.	The	original	example	goes	like	this:		
	
Suppose	 there	 were	 an	 experience	 machine	 that	 would	 give	 you	 any	
experience	you	desired.	Superduper	neuropsychologists	could	stimulate	
your	 brain	 so	 that	 you	would	 think	 and	 feel	 you	were	writing	 a	 great	
novel,	 or	making	 a	 friend,	 or	 reading	 an	 interesting	 book.	 All	 the	 time	
you	would	be	floating	in	a	tank,	with	electrodes	attached	to	your	brain.	




someone	any	 experience	 she	might	want.	 In	more	 contemporary	 terms,	we	 could	
think	of	it	as	the	most	powerful	virtual	reality	machine	ever	conceived.	The	machine	
stimulates	 all	 of	 the	 brain’s	 sensory	 input	 channels,	 providing	 experiences	 as	
phenomenologically	rich	as	any	in	real	life.	For	example,	it	could	give	someone	the	
experience	 of	 skiing	 down	 a	 snowy	mountain	 complete	with	 vision	 of	mountains,	













smoothly	and	swiftly	downward.	 Indeed,	we	are	to	 imagine	that	 the	machine	 is	so	
good	 that,	 from	 within,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 tell	 the	 difference	 between	 real	
experiences	 and	 machine	 produced	 ones.	 It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 note	 that	 once	
someone	enters	the	machine,	the	machine	ensures	that	she	forgets	where	she	is	and	
how	 her	 experiences	 are	 being	 crafted.	 She	 believes	 her	 experience	 is	 real,	 even	
though	it	is	caused	by	electrodes	attached	to	her	brain.		
	 Nozick	 expresses	 confidence	 that	 most	 people	 would	 not	 want	 to	 plug	 in.	
However,	 if	 the	quality	of	experience	is	all	that	matters	in	a	life,	then	it	seems	that	
one	ought	 to	want	 to	plug	 in,	 since	 the	machine	 is,	by	hypothesis,	 the	best	way	 to	
ensure	 large	 quantities	 of	 high	 quality	 experience.	 Interestingly,	 this	 is	 true	 no	
matter	how	you	define	 ‘good’	experience.	 I	 shall	use	 the	 label	 ‘experientialism’	 for	
any	theory	that	defines	well-being	purely	 in	terms	of	mental	states,	 i.e.	any	theory	
that	 says	 only	 experiential	 states	 can	 be	 bearers	 of	 intrinsic	 welfare	 value.		
Hedonism	 is	 simply	 one	 form—albeit	 the	 most	 familiar—of	 experientialism.	
Although	Nozick’s	original	target	was	hedonism,	the	thought	experiment,	if	it	works,	
works	equally	well	against	any	form	of	experientialism.	Many	philosophers	take	the	
example	 to	 show	 both	 that	 ordinary	 people	 do	 not	 think	 about	 welfare	 in	
(exclusively)	 experientialist	 terms,	 and	 that	 the	 correct	 theory	 of	 well-being—
whatever	else	it	is—is	not	experientialist.		
	 Despite	 the	 apparent	 simplicity	 of	 this	 thought	 experiment,	 the	 issues	 it	
raises	 are	 complex	 and	 relatively	 under-explored.	 The	 aim	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	
rectify	 that.	 I	begin	by	considering	how	the	experience	machine	differs	 from	other	
common	 objections	 to	 hedonism.	 I	 take	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 the	 structure	 of	 the	
argument	it	is	supposed	to	provide	against	experientialism.	In	particular,	I	highlight	
some	of	the	confusions	and	problems	that	arise	from	the	specific	way	Nozick	sets	up	
his	 thought	 experiment.	 I	 then	 consider	whether	 it	 is	possible	 to	 re-formulate	 the	
example	 in	 a	way	 that	 avoids	 these	 problems.	 I	 next	 consider	 the	 question:	what	
would	follow	if	we	did	 reject	experientialism?	As	we	shall	see,	 there	would	still	be	
much	 to	 decide	 about	 which	 non-experientialist	 theory	 of	 well-being	 to	 accept.	




















objection	 is,	 depends	 partly	 on	 one’s	 views	 about	 what	 is	 valuable	 in	 conscious	
experience	and	partly	on	how	elastic	one	is	willing	to	be	in	one’s	definition	of	terms	
such	as	‘pleasure’	and	‘pain.’	A	few	examples	may	make	this	clearer.	John	Stuart	Mill	
famously	 defined	 ‘happiness’	 in	 terms	 of	 pleasure	 and	 the	 absence	 of	 pain.5	But	






















label	 ‘hedonism’	 because	 of	 the	 explicit	 rejection	 of	 the	 idea	 that	 pleasure	 is	 the	
major	welfare	value.		
	 Some	 objectors	 in	 this	 category	 go	 even	 further	 and	 argue	 that	 among	 the	
valuable	types	of	consciousness	are	some	painful	or	unpleasant	states.	For	example,	
if	we	sometimes	care	more	about	the	process	of	thinking	or	about	the	contents	of	our	
thoughts	 than	 about	 how	we	 feel,	 we	might	 in	 some	 instances	 reasonably	 prefer	
sensory	pain	over	sensory	pleasure	despite	the	fact	that	traditional	hedonism	would	
view	such	a	preference	as	prudentially	irrational.	James	Griffin	offers	the	example	of	
Sigmund	Freud,	who	during	his	 final	 illness	preferred	 to	 think	 in	 torment	without	
pain	 medications	 given	 that	 the	 medications	 dulled	 his	 thoughts.7	If	 we	 think	
Freud’s	 choice	 makes	 prudential	 sense,	 then	 this	 suggests	 we	 do	 not	 accept	 the	
traditional	hedonist	characterization	of	valuable	consciousness.	However,	in	itself,	it	





that	 there	 are	 more	 types	 of	 valuable	 consciousness	 than	 just	 pleasure,	 Nozick’s	
example	 is	 meant	 to	 establish	 that	 there	 is	 more	 to	 well-being	 than	 valuable	
consciousness	however	one	chooses	to	define	“valuable	consciousness.”		
	 It	is	worth	noting,	that	although	the	experience	machine	is	the	example	used	
most	 often	 to	 attack	 experientialism,	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 other,	 closely	 related	
examples	in	the	literature	on	well-being	that	are	intended	to	make	a	similar	point.	
These	 typically	 don’t	 involve	 a	machine,	 but	 simply	 posit	 deception	 or	 ignorance	
such	as	might	arise	in	the	ordinary	course	of	living.	And	the	person	in	the	example	is	
not	lacking	all	or	even	most	knowledge	of	her	life,	but	simply	knowledge	of	one	or	










Scanlon	uses	 the	example	of	someone	who	 is	secretly	despised	by	those	he	 falsely	
thinks	of	as	friends.9	And	still	other	theorists	appeal	to	examples	in	which	someone	
happily	 believes	 she	 has	 accomplished	 something	 when	 she	 hasn’t	 really.10	The	
differences	are	 less	 important	 than	 the	 similarities,	however.	For	as	with	Nozick’s	
example,	the	point	is	to	elicit	the	intuition	that	something	in	these	lives	is	not	good,	
or	 at	 least	 not	 as	 good	 as	 it	 could	 or	 should	 be,	 and	 this	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	






	 Despite	 its	 fame,	 the	 experience	 machine	 example	 can	 be	 very	 confusing.	
Because	 it	 is	 a	 thought	 experiment,	we	 are	 supposed	 to	 draw	 conclusions	 on	 the	
basis	of	our	own	intuitive	reactions	to	the	case.	Nozick	is	clear	that	he	thinks	most	










Let	 me	 begin	 with	 some	 remarks	 about	 premise	 (2).	 Nozick	 writes	 as	 if	 he	 is	












machine.	 However,	 we	 don’t	 really	 know	 whether	 that	 is	 correct.	 Philosophers	
sometimes	write	and	talk	as	if	it	is	a	well-known	fact	that	most	people	do	not	want	
to	 sign	up.	But	 that	 is	 an	empirical	question,	 and	one	 that	 (to	my	knowledge)	has	
never	 been	 rigorously	 tested.	 Of	 course,	 there	 is	 lots	 of	 anecdotal	 evidence	 from	
philosophers	 who	 have	 taught	 the	 example	 over	 the	 years.	 But	 the	 anecdotal	
evidence	 is	mixed,	 and	 all	 sorts	 of	 factors	may	 contribute	 to	 the	 replies	 students	
give.	 Classrooms	 are	 hardly	 controlled	 environments.	 So	we	 just	 don’t	 know	how	
most	people	would	respond.11		
	 Nonetheless,	it	is	natural	to	wonder:	If	he	were	right,	and	most	people	did	not	
want	 to	 sign	 up,	 would	 that	 demonstrate	 that	 experientialism	 is	 false?	 Not	








least	 in	 theory—could	compete	with	 the	machine.	For	example,	 if	we	assume	 that	
pleasure	is	what	matters,	then	the	claim	would	be	that	it	is	at	least	possible	for	a	real	
life	 to	 contain	 as	much	 pleasure	 as	 a	machine	 life.	 If	 that	were	 the	 case,	 then	 an	
extremely	pleasurable	life	might	be	tied	with	machine	life	for	best.	But	although	this	
isn’t	 logically	 ruled	 out,	 it	 is	 extremely	 unlikely.	 Moreover,	 since	 even	 in	 that	

















welfare.	 Now	 given	 that	 not	 every	motive	 a	 person	 has	 for	 doing	 something	 is	 a	
motive	related	 to	her	own	welfare,	 this	 immediately	raises	 the	question	of	how	to	
distinguish	 reasons	 of	 self-interest	 from	other	 types	 of	 reasons.	 This	 is	 important	
because	it	is	plausible	to	think	that	various	welfare	irrelevant	reasons	may	influence	
the	 choice	 people	make,	 either	 consciously	 or	 unconsciously.	 But	 if	 other	motives	
are	at	work	then	premise	(1)	which	states	that,	“If	some	form	of	experientialism	is	
true,	 most	 people	 will	 want	 to	 sign	 up	 for	 the	 machine”	 might	 be	 false.	
Experientialism	 might	 be	 true	 even	 though	 most	 people	 do	 not	 wish	 to	 sign	 up.	
Unless	we	can	confidently	rule	out	the	influence	of	such	reasons,	which	requires	that	
we	 first	 be	 able	 to	 reliably	 identify	 them,	we	 can’t	 interpret	 lack	of	willingness	 to	
sign	up	as	indicative	of	the	truth	or	falsity	of	experientialism.		
	 In	 the	 literature	one	 can	 find	many	different	expressions	of	 the	 same	basic	




it	 is	still	a	 long,	 long	way	from	being	able	to	substitute	plausibly	 for	all	of	our	 five	
senses,	much	less	for	any	length	of	time.	Thus,	it	can	be	hard	to	give	credence	to	the	
idea	that	a	machine	might	really	be	that	powerful,	and	this	might	make	us	reluctant	
to	 sign	up.	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 it	 can	be	hard	 to	put	 aside	worries	 that	 the	machine	
might	malfunction,	or	might	fail	to	deliver	the	best	possible	experiences.	As	part	of	
the	thought	experiment	we	are	supposed	to	assume	it	won’t	malfunction,	but	how	
could	 we	 ever	 know	 that	 about	 any	 real	 machine?12	As	 we	 shall	 see	 in	 the	 next	













living	 in	 a	machine—would	 agree	 to	 sign	up	 for	 life.	 This	 puts	 us	 in	 a	 very	 funny	
position.	 It	 is	 stipulated	 that	 in	 the	 machine	 we	 will	 have	 great	 experiences	 of	
whatever	 type	we	value.	Moreover,	we	will	not—once	 in	 the	machine—know	that	
our	experiences	aren’t	real.	But	of	course,	as	we	contemplate	whether	to	sign	up,	we	
know	 that	 future	 experiences	 in	 the	 machine	 will	 not	 be	 real.	 And	 because	 this	
invites	all	sorts	of	welfare	irrelevant	reasons	to	come	into	play,	it	creates	problems.		
	 People	can	desire	things	other	than	their	own	welfare,	and	sometimes	these	
desires	 are	 strong	 enough	 to	 lead	 them	 to	 act	 in	 ways	 that	 are	 not	 welfare	
maximizing.	Experientialism	 in	 itself	doesn’t	 rule	 this	out.	 It	 is	 just	a	 theory	about	
what	is	good	for	us,	and	it	could	be	a	true	theory	about	our	good	even	if	we	do	not	
always	choose	what	is	good	for	us.14	For	example,	people	can	have	purely	altruistic	
desires,	 desires	 for	 the	 good	 of	 another	 person.	 If	 that	 is	 possible,	 then	 a	 person	
might	not	want	to	sign	up	because	by	doing	so	she	would	make	it	the	case	that	she	
could	 no	 longer	 help	 others.	 After	 all,	 once	 in	 the	 machine	 she	 would	 no	 longer	





	 Consider	 the	 fact	 that	 many	 people	 have	 a	 strong,	 brute	 desire	 to	 know	
things,	a	desire	that	is	not	obviously	welfare	related.	Though	we	talk	about	curiosity	
killing	the	cat,	we	 invented	that	expression	to	talk	about	ourselves.	 It	points	 to	the	
idea	 that	 there	 is	 a	 stubborn	 quality	 to	 this	 particular	 human	 desire,	 that	 people	














them	 to	 enter.	 In	my	own	 case,	 at	 least,	 I	 know	 I	would	be	unwilling	 to	 enter	 the	
machine,	because	it	would	entail	not	knowing	what	happens	to	those	I	love.	Indeed,	
I	would	go	as	 far	as	 to	 claim	 that	part	of	what	 it	 is	 to	 love	 someone	 is	 to	want	 to	
know	what	happens	to	them.	Of	course,	the	primary	desire	of	one	who	loves	is	the	
desire	 for	 the	welfare	 of	 the	 loved	 one.	 But	 one	 also	wants	 to	 see	 the	 other’s	 life	
unfold,	 to	 track	 the	 loved	 one’s	 progress	 through	 the	 world.	 It	 would	 be	 small	
comfort	simply	to	be	assured	that	my	loved	ones	will	be	okay	if	I	enter	the	machine.	
I	 would	 still	 understand	 that	 a	 choice	 to	 enter	 is	 a	 choice	 to	 forgo	 any	 further	













which	 desires	 are	 self-interested,	 we	 might	 be	 able	 to	 show	 that	 people	 were	
rejecting	 the	 machine	 for	 self-interested	 reasons,	 which	 is	 what	 the	 argument	
against	experientialism	needs.	However,	we	can	only	have	such	a	distinction	 if	we	













	 Another	 problem	with	 Nozick’s	 example	 is	 that	 it	 invites	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	
misreading,	or	(if	not	literally	a	misreading)	at	least	a	conflation	of	issues.	For	many	
people	assume	that	the	point	of	the	example	is	to	persuade	us	that	we	should	never	
for	any	reason	 sign	up	 for	 the	machine.	Certainly	 some	of	what	Nozick	 says	 in	his	
original	presentation	suggests	that	 interpretation.	But	 it	 is	not	necessary	to	accept	
this	 strong	 claim	 in	 order	 to	 reject	 experientialism.	 A	 non-experientialist	 can	
consistently	 grant	 that	 it	 sometimes	makes	 sense	 to	 sign	 up	 for	 the	machine.	 The	




us	what	makes	good	 lives	good.	 But	 ideally	 it	 should	 also	 tell	 us	what	makes	 bad	
lives	 bad,	 and	 which	 possible	 lives	 are	 in	 the	 middle	 and	 why.	 It	 should	 give	 us	
insight	 into	 those	 features	of	 lives	 that	make	 them	better	or	worse,	and	so	enable	
us—at	least	in	theory—to	rank	possible	lives	from	best	to	worst.		
	 Hedonists	 rank	 lives	 according	 to	 a	 total	 score,	 reached	 by	 adding	 up	
pleasure,	adding	up	pains,	and	subtracting	the	pain	from	the	pleasure.	A	positive	net	
score	 (more	 pleasure	 than	 pain)	 is	 good,	 but	 the	 best	 life	 is	 a	 life	 of	 maximal	
pleasure	and	no	pain,	and	the	worst	would	be	a	life	of	maximal	pain	and	no	pleasure.	
Different	experientialist	theories	will,	of	course,	produce	different	rankings,	but	the	
approach	 to	 ranking	will	 be	 similar.	 As	we	 saw	 in	 the	 last	 section,	 the	 important	
truth	about	the	experience	machine	is	that	if	some	version	of	experientialism	is	true	
and	if	we	grant	that	the	machine	really	is	as	powerful	as	it	is	claimed	to	be,	then	life	
in	 the	machine	 represents	 the	 best	 possible	 life,	 or	 at	 least	 the	 best	 possible	 life	
choice.			









life	 falls.	Only	 the	extreme	claim	 that	machine	 life	 is	 the	worst	 possible	 life	would	
support	the	claim	that	it	never,	no	matter	the	alternatives,	makes	sense	to	sign	up.	
Indeed,	many	theorists	who	are	not	hedonists	allow	that	happiness	is	a	significant,	




































scenarios	 in	 which	 they	 were	 told	 that	 they	 have	 been	 living	 in	 an	 experience	
machine.	 They	were	 to	 imagine	 that	 all	 of	 their	memories	were	 produced	 by	 the	
machine,	though	they	presumably	once	had	a	life	out	of	the	machine	that	they	don’t	
remember	 but	 which	 they	 could	 return	 to.	 They	 are	 given	 the	 option	 of	 doing	
precisely	that:	the	option	of	returning	to	real	life.	De	Brigard	used	different	versions	
of	 the	 scenario.	 In	 one	 version	 no	 information	 is	 given	 to	 suggest	 anything	 about	
what	the	real	life	would	be	like.	In	the	other	two	versions	information	about	real	life	
is	given	(in	one	case	suggesting	it	is	not	good,	in	the	other	case	suggesting	it	is	good).	
The	 results	 were	 quite	 divided,	 but	 were	 definitely	 sensitive	 to	 the	 information	
about	how	good	or	bad	the	“real”	life	was.18		




also	 reluctant	 to	do	 so.	He	offers	 an	 interesting	hypothesis	 in	 terms	of	 status	quo	
bias,	 the	 idea,	well-established	in	psychology,	 that	people	are	exceedingly	cautious	





straightforward	 conclusion	 from	 De	 Brigard’s	 results,	 the	 conclusion,	 though	
interesting,	 would	 not	 tell	 us	 anything	 useful	 about	 experientialism.	 By	
straightforward	 conclusion,	 I	mean	 the	 conclusion	 that	would	 be	 suggested	 if	 we	
could	 be	 sure	 that	 nothing	 other	 than	 welfare	 relevant	 considerations	 were	








machine	 life	 is	 one	 of	 the	 worst	 possible	 lives.	 If	 it	 were	 true	 that	 most	 people	
believed	 this,	 then	 one	 would	 expect	 people	 who	 are	 told	 that	 they	 are	 in	 an	









leave.	 But	 in	 De	 Brigard’s	 example,	 unlike	 Nozick’s,	 machine	 life	 was	 not	
characterized	 to	make	 it	 clearly	 best,	 for	 in	 De	 Brigard’s	 example,	machine	 life	 is	
simply	 the	 life	 the	person	has	 lived	up	until	 now,	which,	 like	most	 lives,	 has	both	
good	and	bad	elements.		
	 Second,	 and	 more	 importantly,	 if	 his	 hypothesis	 about	 status	 quo	 bias	 is	
correct,	 then	 it	 is	hard	to	know	what	 to	conclude.	 I	refer	 interested	readers	 to	 the	
details	of	De	Brigard’s	article.	But	in	general,	I	think	that	the	combined	lesson	of	the	






	 Is	 there	 a	 way	 to	 reformulate	 the	 example,	 so	 that	 it	 does	 a	 better	 job	 of	
















Polly	 is	 immediately	 whisked	 away	 by	 the	 same	 superduper	 neuropsychologists	
Nozick	describes,	who	hook	her	up	 to	 an	 experience	machine.	 Inside	 the	machine	
Polly	 lives	 a	 life	 that	 is	 qualitatively	 identical	moment	 for	moment	 to	Molly’s	 life.	
Whatever	Molly	really	does,	Polly	has	a	virtual	experience	that	is—from	the	inside—
indistinguishable.	 Like	Molly,	 Polly	 also	 lives	 for	100	years	 and	 then	dies	 content,	
never	knowing	that	her	 life	was	unreal.	What	we	then	ask	ourselves	 is	this:	do	we	
think	that	their	lives	are	equal	in	prudential	value	or	do	we	think	that	one	of	them	
has	a	better	 life	 than	the	other?	An	experientialist	should	say	the	 lives	are	equally	
good.	 But	 a	 non-experientialist	 will	 think	 that	 Molly’s	 life	 is	 a	 better	 life,	 even	 if	
neither	Molly	nor	Polly	is	positioned	to	make	this	assessment.		
	 Framed	this	way,	the	example	escapes	many	of	the	earlier	concerns.	For	one	
thing,	worries	 about	 how	 to	 imagine	 such	 a	 powerful	machine	 have	 less	 traction,	
since	we	don’t	worry	about	the	future.	We	are	simply	told	what	the	life	was	like	and	
that	 it	 has	 already	 occurred,	 which	 somehow	 seems	 easier	 to	 believe	 or	 grasp,	
precisely	 because	 it	 is	 more	 determinate.	 Similarly,	 worries	 about	 machine	
malfunction	 seem	 to	 evaporate	 from	 this	 perspective,	 since	 we	 are	 no	 longer	






















good	 from	the	 inside,	no	distracting	 issues	about	ranking	arise.	Even	 if	one	 thinks	
that	Polly’s	life	is	worse	than	Molly’s,	one	might	also	think	that	Polly’s	life	is	better	















relevant	 states.	 According	 to	 desire	 theory,	 if	 I	 desire	 to	 accomplish	 some	 goal	 G,	
then	what	 has	 value	 for	me	 is	 the	 coming	 to	 be	 of	 the	 state	 of	 affairs	 in	which	 I	
actually	accomplish	G.	Usually,	of	course,	when	such	states	of	affairs	come	about,	 I	










life	 could	 thus	 be	 better	 than	 she	 thinks	 or	 worse	 than	 she	 thinks.	 I	 shall	 call	
theories	 like	 this—that	 accord	 value	 directly	 to	 states	 of	 affairs—SA	 theories,	 for	
prudential	value	of	states	of	affairs.	It	is	important	to	remember	that	desire	theory	is	
only	one,	albeit	the	most	famous,	example	of	an	SA	theory.		
	 A	 very	 different,	 alternative	 conclusion	 one	 might	 reach	 emphasizes	 the	
prudential	 value	 of	 knowledge	 or	 some	 other	 positive	 epistemic	 relation	 such	 as	
true	belief	or	justified	true	belief.	For	simplicity,	I’ll	just	discuss	knowledge.	On	this	
view,	 knowledge	 about	 the	 facts	 of	 my	 life	 has	 positive	 prudential	 value	 for	 me.	
Again,	of	course,	a	theorist	drawn	to	this	idea	will	need	a	way	of	saying	which	things	
it	is	good	to	know.	Presumably	not	all	knowledge	has	value:	I,	at	any	rate,	see	little	
prudential	 value	 in	 knowing	 the	 number	 of	 ants	 living	 in	my	 backyard!	 Precisely	
because	knowledge	is	a	relation	between	mind	and	world,	it	is	not	purely	mental.	So	
it	 is	the	kind	of	thing	that	Molly	might	have	and	Polly	lack,	even	though	their	 lives	
are	 experientially	 identical.	 I	 shall	 call	 theories	 like	 this—that	 accord	 value	 to	
epistemic	relations—ER	theories,	for	the	prudential	value	of	epistemic	relations.		
	 SA	and	ER	are	very	different,	and	offer	competing	explanations	of	why	Polly’s	
life	 is	 worse	 than	 Molly’s.	 Inside	 the	 experience	 machine	 Polly	 lacks	 knowledge.	
Most	of	her	beliefs	are	false,	even	though	she	doesn’t	know	this.	And	so	an	ER	theory	
would	see	 less	value	 in	her	 life	 than	 in	Molly’s.	But	notice	as	well	 that	most	of	 the	
significant	facts	of	her	life	are	not	as	she	wants	them	to	be	either.	Using	the	desire	
theory	as	 an	example	of	 a	 SA	 theory,	 let	us	 suppose	 that	Polly	 (like	Molly)	 at	 one	
point	wishes	 to	 visit	 Japan.	Whereas	Molly	 actually	 visits	 Japan,	 Polly	merely	 has	
virtual	 experiences	 that	are	 Japan-like.	Though	she	doesn’t	 realize	 it,	her	desire	 is	
frustrated,	not	 satisfied.	 Indeed,	presumably	most	of	Polly’s	 significant	 life	desires	
are	frustrated,	making	her	life	quite	bad	from	the	standpoint	of	a	desire	theory.	If	we	



















both	 are	 better	 than	 either	 1	 or	 3	 (which	 are	 also	 equal	 in	 value).	 Someone	who	
accepts	an	ER	theory	that	accords	no	direct	value	to	states	of	affairs,	will	instead	say	
that	 lives	 1	 and	 2	 are	 equal	 in	 value	 and	 both	 are	 better	 than	 either	 lives	 3	 or	 4	
(which	 are	 also	 equal	 in	 value).	 Of	 course,	 many	 plausible	 non-experientialist	
theories	of	well-being	may	allow	that	both	states	of	affairs	and	epistemic	relations	
are	 important.	One	does	not	have	 to	accept	one	and	reject	 the	other.	The	point	of	
doing	 so	 here	 is	 just	 to	 illustrate,	 as	 dramatically	 as	 possible,	 that	 they	 really	 are	
different	 theses.	 It	 is	 no	 doubt	 also	 true	 that	 many	 plausible	 non-experientialist	
theories	of	well-being	will	accord	intrinsic	value	to	things	other	than	states	of	affairs	
and	 epistemic	 relations.	 For	 example,	many	 theories	will	 accord	 happiness	 some,	
though	not	exclusive,	weight.	If	that’s	correct,	then	rankings	will	be	complicated	in	
more	ways	than	illustrated	here.		 	
	 Still,	 it	 is	 worth	 emphasizing	 the	 difference	 between	 SA	 and	 ER,	 if	 only	
because,	 historically,	 philosophers	 have	 tended	 to	 overlook	 ER	 and	 other	
alternatives	 to	a	pure	SA	theory.	According	to	one	very	popular	and	 familiar	story	
about	 the	 development	 of	 theories	 of	 well-being,	 the	 obvious	 solution	 to	 the	
problem	posed	by	the	experience	machine	is	to	adopt	a	desire	theory.	But	while	it	is	
true	 that	 desire	 theory,	 which	 is	 a	 pure	 SA	 theory,	 is	 an	 alternative	 to	













	 James	 Griffin	 coined	 the	 phrase	 “experience	 requirement”	 in	 the	 course	 of	
talking	 about	 the	 move	 from	 experientialism	 to	 desire	 theory.	 Whereas	
experientialism	embraces,	desire	theory	rejects,	 “the	experience	requirement.”	But	
what	precisely	is	the	experience	requirement?		
	 Following	 Griffin,	 when	 people	 talk	 about	 the	 rejection	 of	 the	 experience	
requirement	they	typically	have	in	mind	a	theory	that	goes	beyond	the	mental	in	a	
very	strong	sense.	They	typically	have	in	mind	a	theory	that	gives	no	necessary	role	
to	mental	 states—a	 theory	 like	a	desire	 theory	 that	assigns	 intrinsic	value	only	 to	
states	 of	 affairs,	 and	 only	 indirectly	 and	 contingently	 to	 mental	 states	 if	 these	
happen	 to	 be	 constituents	 of	 desired	 states	 of	 affairs.	 For	 example,	 a	 person	 can	
desire	the	state	of	affairs	 in	which	she	is	happy	or	the	state	of	affairs	 in	which	she	
knows	 things.	When	 that	 occurs,	mental	 states	 figure	 indirectly	 in	 the	 account	 of	
welfare.	But	on	such	a	view,	there	is	no	necessity	that	prudential	goods	or	bads	be	
experienced	by	the	person	who	is	thus	made	better	or	worse	off.			
	 Having	said	 this,	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	 there	 is	 some	disagreement	 in	
the	 literature	 about	 what	 it	 means	 to	 reject	 or,	 alternatively,	 incorporate,	 an	
experience	 requirement.	 Some	 philosophers	 assume	 that	 any	 theory	 that	 makes	
good	experiences	necessary	for	welfare	is	a	theory	that	incorporates	an	experience	
requirement.	Alternatively,	and	more	in	keeping	with	Griffin’s	usage,	an	experience	








is	 authentic	happiness,	where	 this	phrase	 requires	explanation.	First,	happiness	 is	
understood	as	a	complex	psychological	state.	It	involves	both	judging	one’s	life	to	be	




two	parts.	 I	will	not	go	 into	great	detail	 about	 these,	but	 they	entail	 that	a	person	
who	 is	 happy	 can	 nonetheless	 be	 worse	 off	 than	 she	 thinks	 if	 either	 (a)	 her	
happiness	depends	upon	false	information,	or	if	(b)	her	happiness	is	based	on	values	
that	are	not	authentically	hers.		
	 The	 interesting	 feature	of	Sumner’s	view	 is	 its	asymmetry:	a	person	can	be	
worse	off	than	she	thinks	she	is,	but	she	cannot	be	better	off	than	she	thinks	she	is.		
Happiness	 is	 necessary	 for	 a	 good	 life.	 Since	 you	 know	 you	 are	 happy	 if	 you	 are	
happy,	 you	 are	 either	 doing	 as	 well	 as	 you	 think,	 or	 (if	 your	 happiness	 fails	 the	
external	conditions)	doing	worse	than	you	think.	This	is	clearly	a	theory	that	gives	a	
central	 role	 to	 experiential	 states.	 If	 we	 assume	 that	 to	 have	 an	 experience	
requirement	simply	means	to	make	certain	kinds	of	experience	necessary	for	a	good	
life,	 then	 Sumner’s	 theory	 incorporates	 an	 experience	 requirement.	 And	 this	
appears	to	be	Sumner’s	own	understanding	of	the	idea,	since	he	describes	himself	as	
building	the	experience	requirement	back	in.		
	 However,	 if	we	 consider	 Sumner’s	 view	 in	 light	 of	 the	 second	 definition	 of	
experience	 requirement,	 we	 can	 see	 that	 it	 doesn’t	 build	 in	 an	 experience	
requirement.	 For	 Sumner	doesn’t	 insist	 that	 in	 order	 to	have	 an	 effect	 on	welfare	
something	 must	 be	 experienced.	 Certain	 kinds	 of	 negative	 facts,	 which	 if	 known	
would	undermine	happiness,	can	without	actually	undermining	happiness,	make	a	
person’s	life	worse	than	she	thinks	it	is.	This	is	to	allow	that	certain	states	of	affairs	









	 As	 is	 often	 true	 in	 philosophy	 the	 really	 important	 point	 is	 not	 which	




We	 must	 then	 simply	 keep	 in	 mind	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 a	 theory	 to	 give	 great	
intrinsic	weight	to	experience	without	incorporating	an	experience	requirement.			
	 What	 then	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 experientialism	 and	 the	 experience	
requirement?	 To	 reject	 experientialism	 one	 must	 think	 that	 at	 least	 some	 of	 the	
bearers	 of	 intrinsic	 welfare	 value	 are	 non-mental.	 But	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 reject	
experientialism	and	still	assign	a	big	role	in	one’s	theory	to	experience	(as	Sumner	
does).	 And	 it	 is	 even	 possible	 to	 reject	 experientialism	 without	 rejecting	 the	
experience	requirement	at	all.	For	 it	 is	possible	 to	hold	a	view	 like	 the	one	 I	have	
elsewhere	 called	 the	 conditional	 value	 thesis,	 which	 maintains	 that	 the	 intrinsic	
bearers	of	welfare	value	are	states	of	affairs,	but	insists	that	these	have	value	for	a	
person	 only	 if	 they	 are	 known.22	Assessing	 whether	 or	 not	 such	 a	 view	 has	 any	
plausibility	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 chapter,	 and	 although	 I	 have	 described	 it	
elsewhere	I	do	not	defend	it	there.	I	mention	it	here	simply	to	underscore	the	point	
that	the	rejection	of	experientialism	and	the	rejection	of	an	experience	requirement	
are	not	the	same	thing.		
																																																								
22	Hawkins,	“What	Matters	Beyond	the	Mental?”		
